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Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 21:46:36 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
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PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
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Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 7:03 PM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au> wrote:
> Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com> writes:
>
>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 11:34:25AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:52 PM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au> wrote:
>>> > Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
>>> >
>>> >> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
>>> >> new file mode 100644
>>> >> index 000000000000..e4bf4e7ccdf6
>>> >> --- /dev/null
>>> >> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
>>> >> @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
>>> > ...
>>> >> +
>>> >> +/*
>>> >> + * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
>>> >> + * stack frame (if possible).
>>> >> + *
>>> >> + * 0: not at all on the stack
>>> >> + * 1: fully within a valid stack frame
>>> >> + * 2: fully on the stack (when can't do frame-checking)
>>> >> + * -1: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
>>> >> + */
>>> >> +static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
>>> >> +{
>>> >> + const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
>>> >> + const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
>>> >
>>> > That allows access to the entire stack, including the struct thread_info,
>>> > is that what we want - it seems dangerous? Or did I miss a check
>>> > somewhere else?
>>>
>>> That seems like a nice improvement to make, yeah.
>>>
>>> > We have end_of_stack() which computes the end of the stack taking
>>> > thread_info into account (end being the opposite of your end above).
>>>
>>> Amusingly, the object_is_on_stack() check in sched.h doesn't take
>>> thread_info into account either. :P Regardless, I think using
>>> end_of_stack() may not be best. To tighten the check, I think we could
>>> add this after checking that the object is on the stack:
>>>
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
>>> stackend -= sizeof(struct thread_info);
>>> #else
>>> stack += sizeof(struct thread_info);
>>> #endif
>>>
>>> e.g. then if the pointer was in the thread_info, the second test would
>>> fail, triggering the protection.
>>
>> FWIW, this won't work right on x86 after Andy's
>> CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK patches get merged.
>
> Yeah. I wonder if it's better for the arch helper to just take the obj and len,
> and work out it's own bounds for the stack using current and whatever makes
> sense on that arch.
>
> It would avoid too much ifdefery in the generic code, and also avoid any
> confusion about whether stackend is the high or low address.
>
> eg. on powerpc we could do:
>
> int noinline arch_within_stack_frames(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
> {
> void *stack_low = end_of_stack(current);
> void *stack_high = task_stack_page(current) + THREAD_SIZE;
>
>
> Whereas arches with STACK_GROWSUP=y could do roughly the reverse, and x86 can do
> whatever it needs to depending on whether the thread_info is on or off stack.
>
> cheers
Yeah, I agree: this should be in the arch code. If the arch can
actually do frame checking, the thread_info (if it exists on the
stack) would already be excluded. But it'd be a nice tightening of the
check.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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