Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2022 12:00:45 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 417 v2 (CVE-2022-42320) - Xenstore: Guests can get access to Xenstore nodes of deleted domains -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2022-42320 / XSA-417 version 2 Xenstore: Guests can get access to Xenstore nodes of deleted domains UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Access rights of Xenstore nodes are per domid. When a domain is gone, there might be Xenstore nodes left with access rights containing the domid of the removed domain. This is normally no problem, as those access right entries will be corrected when such a node is written later. There is a small time window when a new domain is created, where the access rights of a past domain with the same domid as the new one will be regarded to be still valid, leading to the new domain being able to get access to a node which was meant to be accessible by the removed domain. For this to happen another domain needs to write the node before the newly created domain is being introduced to Xenstore by dom0. IMPACT ====== In some circumstances, it might be possible for a new guest domain to access resources belonging to a previous domain. The impact would depend on the software in use and the configuration, but might include any of denial of service, information leak, or privilege escalation. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All versions of Xen are in principle vulnerable. Only systems running the C variant of Xenstore (xenstored or xenstore- stubdom) are vulnerable. Systems using the Ocaml variant of Xenstore (oxenstored) are not vulnerable. Vulnerable systems are only those running software where one domain is granted access to another's xenstore nodes, without complete cleanup of those nodes on domain destruction. No such software is enabled in default configurations of upstream Xen. Therefore upstream Xen, without additional management software (in host or guest(s)), is not vulnerable in the default (host and guest) configuration. MITIGATION ========== Running oxenstored instead of xenstored will avoid the vulnerability. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jürgen Groß of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches. xsa417.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.16.x - 4.13.x $ sha256sum xsa417* 62b37c77cc97374685d1df31da57809ddd6c9ad2272fb3380555e81dc85f0cd8 xsa417.meta b0c3bdc1723ead350c86b5a42f5e28445fa331ba5f463d82385fdaeb80119b30 xsa417.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQE/BAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmNg+6gMHHBncEB4ZW4u b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZCj8H93lp5U3OwMNzzrurILUGMY/N6rcGnuoWqa91FslA C7PSK+A51TvrODUi7bo3YQ1mImW75NmyasMey7/I78DUdHuRwj4L9XOI+W9J5ePk oSVBja6jUC6LawLxj21DBP1rhufqVnJ0lOsO6rK+v/awJOkANH1nstUksqvxPmKa ESMDudyo4+2wWH/DKizq6FYexyEQ/rlCktWZTQi1T1PXFX5xMOk+dzd+SSxifX/7 BSLc/HdRzNt1UemKtKvw7KJqCys0Sw8EWAwu6vpQCqczNbkM8CmhzapSWc+IyCZ3 RMOxk9OuW8+6/9D0s4oqWJ7lV4UfW1kZ8euPeybEhLXo5w== =Kkzx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa417.meta" of type "application/octet-stream" (1725 bytes) Download attachment "xsa417.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (4719 bytes)
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