[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID:
<SY4PR01MB6332E573E9457FC8FB277529EEE72@SY4PR01MB6332.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 09:20:04 +0000
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz>
To: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>,
"jcb62281@...il.com" <jcb62281@...il.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2026-9641: Crypt::PBKDF2 versions before
0.261630 for Perl have a weak default algorithm and number of iterations
Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281@...il.com> writes:
>Does the shorter output length (128 bits for MD5; 160 bits for SHA-1) cause
>problems? Has the general advance of computing power caught up to HMAC-MD5
>and HMAC-SHA1, or do they remain secure? (Similar to how DES remains unbroken
>in the cryptanalytic sense, but its 56-bit keyspace is now vulnerable to
>brute force.)
Anything above around 2^110 is computationally infeasible for the indefinite
future (for reference, the entire global Bitcoin hash rate is 2^94 per year).
Peter.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
