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Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:56:15 +0000
From: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@...onical.com>
To: corsac@...ian.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Secure Boot bypass in EDK2 based Virtual Machine firmware
In the case of these OVMF/AAVMF images I believe the only other
built-in application accessible is the firmware setup utility and boot
selector.
These obviously provide many capabilities, but require a user present
at the console to access, and to the best of my knowledge not
vulnerable to this attack.
For firmware images provided by other vendors or distributors, I have no idea.
On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 3:52 PM Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 03:47:23PM +0000, Mate Kukri wrote:
> > That is correct in the general case, but here the issue comes from the
> > fact that a copy of the Shell was included in the firmware image
> > itself, and as a built-in application was implicitly trusted.
>
> Ah, thanks for the clarification, I didn't know about the implicit trust
> on "built-in applications". Out of curiosity, are there other such
> applications, which could be abused?
>
> Regards,
> --
> Yves-Alexis Perez
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