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Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2019 20:50:37 +0200
From: "Sebastian Nielsen" <sebastian@...be.eu>
To: "'Heiko Schlittermann'" <hs@...marc.schlittermann.de>,
"'oss-security'" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>,
<exim-users@...m.org>
Subject: Sv: [exim] CVE-2019-15846: Exim - local or remote attacker can execute programs with root privileges
Shouldn't this be in connect ACL?
How would the deny in MAIL FROM prevent the exploit? What I have understand is that there is exploit in the SNI of the TLS negotiation, thus the whole connect attempt must be rejected right?
-----Ursprungligt meddelande-----
Från: Exim-users <exim-users-bounces+sebastian=sebbe.eu@...m.org> För Heiko Schlittermann via Exim-users
Skickat: den 6 september 2019 13:22
Till: oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>; Exim Users <exim-users@...m.org>
Ämne: Re: [exim] CVE-2019-15846: Exim - local or remote attacker can execute programs with root privileges
An Update to the mitigation for the current CVE:
Add - as part of the mail ACL (the ACL referenced by the main config
option "acl_smtp_mail"):
deny condition = ${if eq{\\}{${substr{-1}{1}{$tls_in_sni}}}}
deny condition = ${if eq{\\}{${substr{-1}{1}{$tls_in_peerdn}}}}
This should prevent the currently known attack vector.
Best regards from Dresden/Germany
Viele Grüße aus Dresden
Heiko Schlittermann
--
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Heiko Schlittermann, Dipl.-Ing. (TU) - {fon,fax}: +49.351.802998{1,3} -
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