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Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 19:46:03 +0300
From: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE-2018-0737 OpenSSL: RSA key generation follows several non
 constant time code paths

Hey Folks,

We discovered 3 vulnerabilities in OpenSSL that allow cache-timing
enabled attackers to recover RSA private keys during key generation.

1. BN_gcd gets called to check that _e_ and _p-1_ are relatively
prime. This function is not constant time, and leaks critical GCD
state leading to information on _p_.

2. During primality testing, BN_mod_inverse gets called without the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set during Montgomery arithmetic setup. The resulting
code path is not constant time, and leaks critical GCD state leading
to information on _p_.

3. During primality testing, BN_mod_exp_mont gets called without the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set during modular exponentiation, with an exponent
_x_ satisfying _p - 1 = 2**k * x_ hence recovering _x_ gives you most
of _p_. The resulting code path is not constant time, and leaks
critical exponentiation state leading to information on _x_ and hence
_p_.

OpenSSL issued CVE-2018-0737 to track this issue.

# Affected software

LibreSSL fixed these issues (nice!) way back when this was reported in
Jan 2017. Looks like commits

5a1bc054398ec4d2c33e5bdc3a16eece01c8901d
952c1252f58f5f57227f5efaeec0169759c77d72

We verified that with a debugger.

OTOH, OpenSSL wanted concrete evidence of exploitability. That's what
we did over the past year and a half or so.We ran with bug (1) and
recover RSA keys with cache-timings, achieving roughly 30% success
rate in over 10K trials on a cluster.

Affects 1.1.0, 1.0.2, and presumably all the EOL lines.

## Fixes

Recently, it looks like (1) was independently discovered, and some
code changes happened. Nothing for (2) and (3).

### 1.0.2-stable

Part of the fix (1) is in commits

0d6710289307d277ebc3354105c965b6e8ba8eb0
64eb614ccc7ccf30cc412b736f509f1d82bbf897
0b199a883e9170cdfe8e61c150bbaf8d8951f3e7

In combination with our contributed patch in

349a41da1ad88ad87825414752a8ff5fdd6a6c3f

we verified with a debugger they cumulatively solve (1) (2) and (3).

### 1.1.0-stable

Part of the fix (1) is in commits

7150a4720af7913cae16f2e4eaf768b578c0b298
011f82e66f4bf131c733fd41a8390039859aafb2
9db724cfede4ba7a3668bff533973ee70145ec07

In combination with our contributed patch in

6939eab03a6e23d2bd2c3f5e34fe1d48e542e787

we verified with a debugger they cumulatively solve (1) (2) and (3).

Look for our preprint on http://eprint.iacr.org/ soon -- working title
is "One Shot, One Trace, One Key: Cache-Timing Attacks on RSA Key
Generation". We'll update the list with the full URL once it's posted.

# Timeline

Jan 2017: Notified OpenSSL, LibreSSL, BoringSSL
4 Apr 2018: Notified OpenSSL again, with PoC and 16 Apr, 15:00 UTC embargo
11 Apr 2018: Notified distros list
16 Apr 2018: Notified oss-security list

Thanks for reading!

Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya
Cesar Pereida Garcia
Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia
Billy Brumley

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