Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 23:18:37 +0100
From: Daniel Beck <>
Subject: Re: Multiple vulnerabilities in Jenkins

> On 14. Feb 2018, at 16:35, Daniel Beck <> wrote:
> The form validation for the proxy configuration form did not check the 
> permission of the user accessing it, allowing anyone with Overall/Read 
> access to Jenkins to cause Jenkins to send a GET request to a specified 
> URL, optionally with a specified proxy configuration.
> If that request’s HTTP response code indicates success, the form validation 
> is returning a generic success message, otherwise the HTTP status code is 
> returned. It was not possible to reuse an existing proxy configuration to 
> send those requests; that configuration had to be provided by the attacker.


> Jenkins did not take into account case-insensitive file systems when 
> preventing access to plugin resource files that should not be accessible. 
> This allowed users with Overall/Read permission to download plugin resource 
> files in META-INF and WEB-INF directories, such as the plugins' JAR files, 
> which could contain hardcoded secrets.


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Your e-mail address:

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ