Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2017 11:59:51 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 246 (CVE-2017-17044) - x86: infinite loop due to missing PoD error checking -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-17044 / XSA-246 version 3 x86: infinite loop due to missing PoD error checking UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== CVE assigned. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Failure to recognize errors being returned from low level functions in Populate on Demand (PoD) code may result in higher level code entering an infinite loop. IMPACT ====== A malicious HVM guest can cause one pcpu to permanently hang. This normally cascades into the whole system freezing, resulting in a a host Denial of Service (DoS). VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen versions from 3.4.x onwards are affected. Only x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM is not vulnerable. x86 PV VMs cannot leverage the vulnerability. Only systems with 2MiB or 1GiB HAP pages enabled are vulnerable. The vulnerability is largely restricted to HVM guests which have been constructed in Populate-on-Demand mode (i.e. with memory < maxmem): x86 HVM domains without PoD (i.e. started with memory == maxmem, or without mentioning "maxmem" in the guest config file) also cannot leverage the vulnerability, in recent enough Xen versions: 4.8.x and later: all versions safe if PoD not configured 4.7.x: 4.7.1 and later safe if PoD not configured 4.6.x: 4.6.4 and later safe if PoD not configured 4.5.x: 4.5.4 and later safe if PoD not configured 4.4.x and earlier: all versions vulnerable even if PoD not configured The commit required to prevent this vulnerability when PoD not configured is 2a99aa99fc84a45f505f84802af56b006d14c52e xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself and the corresponding backports. MITIGATION ========== Running only PV guests will avoid this issue. Running HVM guests only in non-PoD mode (maxmem == memory) will also avoid this issue. NOTE: In older releases of Xen, an HVM guest can create PoD entries itself; so this mitigation will not be effective. Specifying "hap_1gb=0 hap_2mb=0" on the hypervisor command line will avoid the vulnerability. Alternatively, running all x86 HVM guests in shadow mode will also avoid this vulnerability. (For example, by specifying "hap=0" in the xl domain configuration file.) CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Julien Grall of Linaro. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa246.patch xen-unstable xsa246-4.9.patch Xen 4.9.x, Xen 4.8.x xsa246-4.7.patch Xen 4.7.x, Xen 4.6.x, Xen 4.5.x $ sha256sum xsa246* df08a3be419f2384b495dc52c3e6ebef1eb67d8b562afe85fb6fe6a723334472 xsa246.patch b41550688e88a2a7a22349a07168f3a3ddf6fad8b3389fa27de44ae6731b6a8b xsa246-4.7.patch ea591542774c22db65dcb340120cebf58e759670b5a9fbde42ee93ed594650c8 xsa246-4.9.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators, with ONE exception: Removing the ability to boot in populate-on-demand mode is NOT permitted during the embargo on public cloud systems. This is because doing so might alert attackers to the nature of the vulnerability. Deployment of this mitigation is permitted only AFTER the embargo ends. Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJaH/KNAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZi5sIAJojGRp1oewRc3JkEolFITBb EcQDq9n7ppd21q+hRmYKT+IwRILahxGFbfQJHzCbu9KHFNswt9dgFNlkBk2Jk+rD q3LzoSeIBrNVazfIX6VpGtgrPxlsAJzsmvAp5LgdZ+H3tYqsHYdyeoaPFAtbuB40 6WgBWv2Z003uRCvK5F8ka3cRrWsuuiae9gnUKfLjt4eAu7rES8wFG+VE4n/o6RLg YJuyCL97rYXgBRAABO/1bR7mKWhyux3WbtZjjDSnUcn+O3UOpVH49bL5JHb1XKuS ycdwYtfjTwB7nB1o7TnYGEQKieqlWDWOylWTWJxA3cOsIHHB2syTV3L9vVukti0= =CmSs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa246.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2717 bytes) Download attachment "xsa246-4.7.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2866 bytes) Download attachment "xsa246-4.9.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (2842 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ