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Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 22:14:32 +0100
From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@...lk.net>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Security risk of vim swap files
* Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>, 2017-11-06, 21:00:
>I don't know what state glibc was in with regard to honoring, ignoring,
>or unsetting TMPDIR in SUID programs in 1998-1999.
glibc's tempnam() did inadvertently honor TMPDIR in setuid/setgid
programs, but the bug was fixed in 1996:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commitdiff;h=d68171edce96cb59b5cb869f6a82afcc50db00be
In 2000, glibc started unsetting TMPDIR in such programs:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commitdiff;h=74955460c5b9f23d7783395ce2478f5b7c5fd876
Curiously, Hurd implementation of tmpfile() seems to honor TMPDIR:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/mach/hurd/tmpfile.c;h=8bcfb81a104f37f271b18fe2eea3d40f7d101634;hb=HEAD#l40
--
Jakub Wilk
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