Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2017 12:03:29 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security-team-members@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 231 (CVE-2017-14316) - Missing NUMA node parameter verification -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-14316 / XSA-231 version 3 Missing NUMA node parameter verification UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Updated metadata file Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The function `alloc_heap_pages` allows callers to specify the first NUMA node that should be used for allocations through the `memflags` parameter; the node is extracted using the `MEMF_get_node` macro. While the function checks to see if the special constant `NUMA_NO_NODE` is specified, it otherwise does not handle the case where `node >= MAX_NUMNODES`. This allows an out-of-bounds access to an internal array. IMPACT ====== An attacker using crafted hypercalls can execute arbitrary code within Xen. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All versions of Xen are affected. Both ARM and x86 are affected. Both systems running HVM guests and system running PV guests are affected. MITIGATION ========== No known mitigation. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Matthew Daley. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa231.patch xen-unstable xsa231-4.9.patch Xen 4.9, Xen 4.8 xsa231-4.7.patch Xen 4.7, Xen 4.6 xsa231-4.5.patch Xen 4.5 $ sha256sum xsa231* 4255d2bc4ca668e7abcbf8256b0a8f21acef2a47a06d626aad6d22c685034587 xsa231.meta b72af3fb8c44925ea7973533e8a8701becfc194f3e1c97f12af0392e1edd16a3 xsa231.patch d9853b2d2649679d8810bd7e93f7b51bd9fefb3472da60ae464bde88aae3389c xsa231-4.5.patch ce29b56a0480f4835b37835b351e704d204bb0ccd22325f487127aa2776cc2cf xsa231-4.7.patch 71a53a5133c8d4e381dd0e3e54205d31dea545ab62b261084dd3aea140f88cad xsa231-4.9.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJZt80DAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZrooIALgotDR4DC367J1SF87V2dHW Wo2O05rF8uBl12ofMA4LirjPfbNq49ZikaDr01jq+srFZLDw72IzgjbNJOwThkZt DHFR12LABvAPHT/Je58vGqS24HKKhK1o+Q0vDcbZHzBGXkj6gwxNC+DJAzF9D9Ye qXtZv4GmkmhFs0nQuzUF8bLu7ZvIQjB7QVoXnOvynx/mpCI9GPvoRGLptIJhbc8A CqSLsgF+7cXC6E8u/pp9XorpsQf2ekQwJMkLiG3UXieeShwrmY1mCE/vWBgsFeyj k7/+dQhj6X+7vwLA385Df3cF7hDjDi23AJMUN1AuVd9fx9/ie4o+9nJIa0FpUOA= =al8X -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ]
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