Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 18:08:53 -0400 From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@...thhorseman.net> To: Russ Allbery <eagle@...ie.org>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Insecure DNS dependency in many Kerberos deployments On Wed 2017-08-16 10:52:54 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote: > Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> writes: > >> As a rule of thumb, the impact is similar to running TLS with CA-based >> certificate validation, but without host name checks (but perhaps >> slightly less because the trust domains could be much smaller). > > I think this overstates the impact somewhat. This is more worrisome with > TLS because for most TLS applications there is a single global trust > domain with certificates issued by dozens or hundreds of parties and no > organizational scoping. fwiw, I think that's what Florian means by his parenthetical aside. > This is a much higher bar to meet, and in a lot of organizations this > bar cannot be easily met by an attacker. While i understand the desire to be clear about the constrained scope of the risk, i think another way of saying what you're saying is "control over one service in a domain and the ability to poison the DNS allows that service operator to masquerade as any other service in the domain". Even for domains where a single administrator controls all machines, this violates principles of privilege separation that admins rely on to be able to deploy potentially-buggy services without putting the other services at risk. So i think it's worth taking this seriously, despite(?) its age and widespread deployment. > For the record, those are settings for *a* Kerberos client library, > not *the* Kerberos client library (specifically, the MIT Kerberos > implementation). Heimdal does not use those settings, and there are > other Kerberos implementations as well. The fact that some client libraries *don't* do this should give us hope that it's fixable, even in existing deployments :) --dkg [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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