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Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2017 14:51:27 +0100
From: John Haxby <john.haxby@...cle.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: accepting new members to (linux-)distros lists

Solar,

I think (linux-)distros is working quite well but part of that is
regularly looking at the processes etc to refine them.

On 02/07/17 23:44, Solar Designer wrote:
> Now, I understand that many of the distros are probably entering stuff
> into their bug trackers anyway.  Often on shared or/and centrally
> managed systems.  I hope most only do so for bugs that are actually
> relevant to them, or at least that are likely to be relevant.

In our case we do put relevant issues into our bug tracking behemoth...

> 
> Maybe we should make this limitation part of list policy ("do not enter
> the newly arriving issues into bug trackers unless and until you're
> reasonably confident the issues are relevant to you")?  Or forbid use of
> bug trackers for the embargoed issues arriving through the distros list
> altogether, but I'm quite sure many of the existing distros list members
> won't accept that. :-(

... and I agree that only tracking issues that are relevant is highly
desirable.  Sometimes, of course, it only becomes apparent that it's not
relevant after some work has been done.

What I would say though is that embargoed issues that go on a bug
tracker should be not be visible to anyone that doesn't have an actual
need to know.  If an internal bug tracker is generally open to anyone
internal then for the purposes of embargo it might as well be public.

It _should_ be self-evident that "need to know" includes making sure
entries in internal bug trackers need to be similarly restricted but I
do wonder if it's worth calling that out explicitly?

jch


PS For contributing back I have given myself a "must try harder" mark.

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