Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 12:41:33 +0200 From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: ISC Security Officer <security-officer@....org> Subject: Re: ISC announces two BIND vulnerabilities On Fri, 2017-06-30 at 01:09 -0800, ISC Security Officer wrote: > On Thursday (29 June) Internet Systems Consortium disclosed two security > vulnerabilities in BIND. Details on the individual vulnerabilities > can be found in our knowledge base: > > CVE-2017-3142: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01504/74/CVE-2017-3142 > CVE-2017-3143: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01503/74/CVE-2017-3143 > > New software releases have been issued containing these security fixes; > they are available from our download page at http://www.isc.org/downloads > As per list policy, and since I'm following these for Debian, here's some more details inline for the list. The vulnerabilities are very similar to the knot one (no CVE yet) found by the same researchers (Synaktiv): CVE-2017-3142: An error in TSIG authentication can permit unauthorized zone transfers An attacker who is able to send and receive messages to an authoritative DNS server and who has knowledge of a valid TSIG key name may be able to circumvent TSIG authentication of AXFR requests via a carefully constructed request packet. A server that relies solely on TSIG keys for protection with no other ACL protection could be manipulated into: * providing an AXFR of a zone to an unauthorized recipient * accepting bogus NOTIFY packets CVE-2017-3043: An error in TSIG authentication can permit unauthorized dynamic updates An attacker who is able to send and receive messages to an authoritative DNS server and who has knowledge of a valid TSIG key name for the zone and service being targeted may be able to manipulate BIND into accepting an unauthorized dynamic update. Regards, -- Yves-Alexis Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (489 bytes)
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