Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 13:54:36 -0400 From: Leo Famulari <leo@...ulari.name> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Re: ImageMagick: CVE-2017-9098: use of uninitialized memory in RLE decoder On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 08:26:36AM -0700, Ian Zimmerman wrote: > On 2017-05-20 09:26, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote: > > > Chris Evans discovered that ImageMagick uses unitialized memory in the > > RLE decoder, allowing an attacker to leak sensitive information from > > process memory space. There is missing initialization in the > > ReadRLEImage function. > > > > Original article at: > > > > https://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2017/05/bleed-continues-18-byte-file-14k-bounty.html > > It was good to see the discussion of how GraphicsMagick was affected, or > not. I would love to see that in all *Magick weakness reports. Chris Evans' report (copied in the email you replied to) says this: GraphicsMagick vs. ImageMagick, again. Well, well, look at this :) GraphicsMagick fixed this issue in March 2016, for the v1.3.24 release, tucked away in a changeset titled "Fix SourceForge bug #371 "out-of-bounds read in coders/rle.c:633:39" (see the second memset()). This is another case where tons of vulnerabilities are being found and fixed in both GraphicsMagick and ImageMagick with little co-ordination. This seems like a waste of effort and a risk of 0-day (or is it 1-day?) exposure. It goes both ways: the RLE memory corruption I referenced in my previous blog post was only fixed in GraphicsMagick in March 2016, having been previously fixed in ImageMagick in Dec 2014. [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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