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Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 09:49:04 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <>
Cc: "" <>,
	St├ęphane Graber <>,
Subject: Re: LXC: CVE-2017-5985: lxc-user-nic didn't verify
 network namespace ownership

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 06:45:34AM -0400, Stiepan wrote:
> Thanks to the 2.0.7-2 update by Evgeni Golov and his crystal-clear instructions on how to use lxcbr0 with this version, I could confirm that the issue with the host's routing table being affected by changes in the containers' routing tables is not there anymore when using that version (lxc 2.0.7-2 from jessie-backports), which includes the fixes to CVE-2017-5985 which were brought in LXC 2.0.7 (upstream).
> This was thus basically a variation of said CVE, which probably doesn't need to be separately numbered as such, the core problem at stake being the same:
> network namespace ownership was not respected by a setuid-root program enabling the user to configure networks as non-root, which is now solved.
> This leads me to a suggestion to the upstream developers: couldn't the same be achieved using specific network-related capabilities, instead of setuid-root, thereby further reducing the risk of lxc-user-nic being exploited and hence, reducing overall attack surface (in unprivileged mode)?
> I have read in that the approach of using "targeted capabilities" was then considered. This is probably the closest to what I am suggesting (specifically for lxc-user-nic - the current approach with 1-1 uid mappings seems fine for network-unrelated things).

The targeted capabilities wouldn't help here, because in fact
lxc-user-nic requires privilege against the parent namespace.


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