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Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 15:47:23 +0000
From: "Radzykewycz, T (Radzy)" <radzy@...driver.com>
To: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
CC: "cve-assign@...re.org" <cve-assign@...re.org>
Subject: RE: [security-vendor] Re: MITRE is adding data
 intake to its CVE ID process

> C6. I want MITRE to send the https://cveform.mitre.org form data
> to the oss-security list as soon as that data is entered (i.e.,
> before a CVE ID exists).

This was one of the thoughts I had originally, but I decided
against actually proposing it.  (See below.)

> R6. We have had internal discussions within MITRE about this. We
> are not yet able to implement this easily. We may work on this if
> the community requires this approach. However, our understanding
> of CVE consumers is that they look to MITRE as a source of
> vulnerability information after a CVE ID number exists, not before.

Without commenting about the possible difficulty to implement
this, it might make sense to have this under the control of
the reporter: Add a check button for the requestor to send the
contents automatically.

(Note that if the check button is not checked, then the sender can
send the data manually if they wish.  So no need to consider any
"what if they change their mind" type of question.)

I suppose that one difficulty would be for the message to be sent
apparently from the reporter's email address.  Not doing this
might be a way to subvert some email restrictions, which might
be considered improper.  So I suspect that this would actually
require an email confirmation ("follow this link to have the
message sent to the list").  But if that is required, then it's
probably almost as easy to simply send a confirmation email to
the reporter, which includes a brief comment about forwarding to
the list.

So on consideration, I suspect it would be best not to do this.  I
don't think that a "proper" implementation would actually save
the reporter significant time/effort.

Enjoy!

-- radzy

________________________________________
From: cve-assign@...re.org [cve-assign@...re.org]
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 7:59 PM
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: [security-vendor] [oss-security] Re: MITRE is adding data intake to its CVE ID process

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

All,

Thanks to all who have provided constructive and meaningful feedback
on this change up to this point. This reply will hopefully answer all
of the concerns so far. We are hearing 11 distinct concerns, listed
below as C1 through C11, along with our responses of R1 through R11.
If you have any ideas or suggestions for improvements to the CVE web
form, we are completely open to this.


C1. What exactly has changed after MITRE's 2017-02-09 announcement?

R1. There are two changes. Each of the two changes is about the case
where an oss-security participant is immediately ready to make a
public disclosure, and wants an accompanying CVE ID. First, the person
must visit https://cveform.mitre.org to make the CVE request (but can
also send the vulnerability information to oss-security at the same
time). Second, we would like a vulnerability description (i.e., a
sentence or two about the product name, affected versions, problem
type, impact, and attack methodology) so that we can publish the CVE
on https://cve.mitre.org much more quickly. We recognize that, in a
fraction of the cases (e.g., unanalyzed fuzzer results), a description
would have very limited information.


C2. Can I still obtain a CVE ID if I'm not yet willing to disclose
what the vulnerability is, and cannot offer any public reference URL?

R2. Yes, simply visit https://cveform.mitre.org and leave the
"Reference(s)" box blank. Alternatively, you can enter a reference
URL, and use the "Additional information" box to clarify that neither
the reference nor the CVE should be public yet. This is not a change
to how the oss-security list has be used. The oss-security list has
always been about only public vulnerabilities.


C3. MITRE currently has documentation such as
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html that recommends contacting
DWF if an Open Source product does not appear on a certain list.

R3. In all cases where our documentation suggests contacting DWF,
please use https://cveform.mitre.org instead at this time. DWF is
currently ramping up their operations. CVE is covering all Open Source
software. There is no list that is excluding anything.


C4. I have historically obtained CVE IDs from the CNA of a specific
Linux distribution (e.g., Debian, Ubuntu, or Red Hat) and they are
still willing to provide CVE IDs to me. May I continue?

R4. Yes.


C5. I want MITRE to send the https://cveform.mitre.org form data, and
the CVE ID, to the oss-security list at the same time that these are
sent to the requester.

R5. We have had internal discussions within MITRE about this. We are
able to implement this easily if the community requires this approach.
At the moment, we are expecting the requester to resend this
information to oss-security once they accept their CVE ID assignment.
Please see http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/09/26
for an example.


C6. I want MITRE to send the https://cveform.mitre.org form data to
the oss-security list as soon as that data is entered (i.e., before a
CVE ID exists).

R6. We have had internal discussions within MITRE about this. We are
not yet able to implement this easily. We may work on this if the
community requires this approach. However, our understanding of CVE
consumers is that they look to MITRE as a source of vulnerability
information after a CVE ID number exists, not before.


C7. When using the https://cveform.mitre.org site, it is unclear what
a "vendor" is, e.g., must it be the name of a Linux distribution?

R7. The vendor is the name of the upstream project or organization
that maintains the Open Source software. If there isn't any project
name or organization name, then the name of the software can be used
as the vendor name.


C8. A CAPTCHA makes it difficult to do high-volume vulnerability
reporting.

R8. We agree. The https://cveform.mitre.org use case is persons with
low-volume reporting needs. We will announce other solutions for
high-volume reporting. You can contact us, using the
https://cveform.mitre.org "request type: Other" option, if you need a
high-volume workaround now.


C9. I want to obtain CVE IDs faster in the future. Is there a plan for
that?

R9. Yes, we anticipate that, in the future, hundreds of Open Source
projects will become CNAs for their own vulnerabilities. This will be
coordinated under DWF. In other words, an individual Open Source
project will have a "sub-CNA" role. The initial documentation is on
the
https://github.com/distributedweaknessfiling/DWF-Documentation/blob/master/README.md
web page.


C10. I do not want to use Google docs. Is there any other option?

R10. First, Google docs is applicable only to DWF, which is currently
ramping up their operations, and is not a required entity for any CVE
ID requests at present. Also, we do not expect that Google docs will
be applicable to persons or organizations with a higher level of DWF
participation, such as sub-CNA participation. At the higher levels,
DWF currently uses GitHub, not Google docs.


C11. The https://cveform.mitre.org X.509 certificate chain is
incomplete.

R11. Yes, we realize this and will be adding the missing item (Entrust
Certification Authority - L1K) soon.


Regards,

- --
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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