Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 12:43:17 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 208 (CVE-2017-2615) - oob access in cirrus bitblt copy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-2615 / XSA-208 oob access in cirrus bitblt copy ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= When doing bitblt copy backwards, qemu should negate the blit width. This avoids an oob access before the start of video memory. IMPACT ====== A malicious guest administrator can cause an out of bounds memory access, possibly leading to information disclosure or privilege escalation. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Versions of qemu shipped with all Xen versions are vulnerable. Xen systems running on x86 with HVM guests, with the qemu process running in dom0 are vulnerable. Only guests provided with the "cirrus" emulated video card can exploit the vulnerability. The non-default "stdvga" emulated video card is not vulnerable. (With xl the emulated video card is controlled by the "stdvga=" and "vga=" domain configuration options.) ARM systems are not vulnerable. Systems using only PV guests are not vulnerable. For VMs whose qemu process is running in a stub domain, a successful attacker will only gain the privileges of that stubdom, which should be only over the guest itself. Both upstream-based versions of qemu (device_model_version="qemu-xen") and `traditional' qemu (device_model_version="qemu-xen-traditional") are vulnerable. MITIGATION ========== Running only PV guests will avoid the issue. Running HVM guests with the device model in a stubdomain will mitigate the issue. Changing the video card emulation to stdvga (stdvga=1, vga="stdvga", in the xl domain configuration) will avoid the vulnerability. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa208-qemuu.patch qemu-xen, mainline qemu xsa208-qemut.patch qemu-xen-traditional $ sha256sum xsa208* 4369cce9b72daf2418a1b9dd7be6529c312b447b814c44d634bab462e80a15f5 xsa208-qemut.patch 1e516e3df1091415b6ba34aaf54fa67eac91e22daceaad569b11baa2316c78ba xsa208-qemuu.patch $ NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== This issue has already been publicly disclosed. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJYnbVQAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZs2sIAKtkU1ptqojrE6GpgdMegdIS hMcCcEVdDoYt47z9BxXcNA87kyjGLbIaliACF3GQclhBy8f6Ytm6MLQMvh79YO/l 8AvZELKSo5U/Z1El/HQ/ezzWTV15FHwdG64HvDf7SdlRquVyS0fxWLuiq8gmWXRd bpGcbAwwdRHvrvguMpajif89ZfTWPSHRq8onS1C96SBJW8aUXxzzyKWoX1EvNWN3 vnKC5eXQ5uhLERmh6meIZo2OwB7PlMTuasgVJan915/CGF8CS+B5wqQmiL0uxfRT fnTBVTfXHC/TzkkREJtnwgHIEv/E+Vygheeg/2P9bEaNkiN3CG5kK/ZOxgWNYU4= =eEKh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Download attachment "xsa208-qemut.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1518 bytes) Download attachment "xsa208-qemuu.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1486 bytes)
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