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Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 10:07:43 +0000 (UTC)
From: S├ębastien Delafond <seb@...ian.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE request: tomcat privilege escalations in Debian packaging

Hello,

the Debian security team would like to request 2 CVEs for issues in
Tomcat packaging. Both were discovered by Paul Szabo.

  * Privilege escalation when upgrading tomcat8 package
    https://bugs.debian.org/845393

    > Having installed tomcat8, the directory /etc/tomcat8/Catalina is
    > set writable by group tomcat8, as per the postinst script. Then
    > the tomcat8 user, in the situation envisaged in DSA-3670 and
    > DSA-3720, see also http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Oct/4
    > could use something like commands
    > 
    >   mv -i /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/localhost /tmp
    >   ln -s /etc/shadow /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/localhost
    > 
    > to create a symlink.
    > 
    > Then when the tomcat8 package is upgraded (e.g. for the next DSA),
    > the postinst script runs
    > 
    >   chmod 775 /etc/tomcat8/Catalina /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/localhost
    > 
    > and that will make the /etc/shadow file world-readable (and
    > group-writable). Other useful attacks might be to make the
    > objects:
    > 
    >   /root/.Xauthority
    >   /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
    > 
    > world-readable; or make something (already owned by group tomcat8)
    > group-writable (some "policy" setting maybe?).

  * Privilege escalation when removing tomcat8 package
    https://bugs.debian.org/845385

    > Having installed tomcat8, the directory /etc/tomcat8/Catalina is
    > set writable by group tomcat8, as per the postinst script. Then
    > the tomcat8 user, in the situation envisaged in DSA-3670 and
    > DSA-3720, see also http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Oct/4
    > could use something like commands
    >
    >  # touch /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/attack
    >  # chmod 2747 /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/attack
    >
    > to create a file.
    >
    > Then if the tomcat8 package is removed (purged?), the postrm
    > script runs 
    > 
    >  chown -Rhf root:root /etc/tomcat8/
    >
    > and that will leave the file world-writable, setgid root: 
    >
    > # ls -l /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/attack
    > -rwxr-Srwx 1 root root 0 Nov 23 09:00 /etc/tomcat8/Catalina/attack
    >
    > allowing "group root" access to the world.

Cheers,

--Seb

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