Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 07:41:04 -0400 From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Stack guard canary massaging On Mon, 2016-10-31 at 12:22 +0100, Solar Designer wrote: > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:48:45AM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > > Sorry for cross-posting. > > Sorry to bikeshed, but I think this isn't a kernel-hardening topic at > all, so the thread should continue on oss-security only, please. > > Florian, if there's a reason why you think it's kernel-hardening > related, please let me know. To me, it looks like userspace hardening > that is not even kernel-assisted (at least not directly in this place, > even though the kernel may have helped provide the random numbers). > > If your cross-posting was to reach more of the right people, then you > have already done so, and they can join oss-security now. ;-) > > Alexander The kernel supports SSP but it doesn't appear to do the same thing. arch/*/include/asm/stackprotector.h Why do the non-x86 implementations XOR in LINUX_VERSION_CODE though? Is it supposed to be a placeholder for a random at compile-time value? :\ It's not harmful but that's just... weird. [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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