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Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2016 16:30:25 +0000
From: "Seaman, Chad" <>
To: "" <>, "CVE
 ID Requests" <>
CC: Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE Request: IKEv1 protocol is vulnerable to
 DoS amplification attack

1 more thing.

I was in communications with a contact from Cisco and the IKE RFC committee.  While this CVE request/discussion seems scoped for IKEv1, there are a selection of hosts running IKEv2 that appear to reuse their software stack/logic, causing some instances of IKEv2 exhibiting similar functionality and providing (D)DoS potential.


On 10/19/16, 12:27 PM, "Seaman, Chad" <> wrote:

    Hi All,
    I’m a little late to the conversation but I did some fairly extensive research on this topic about 9 months ago, white paper here.
    On 10/18/16, 10:58 PM, "Kurt Seifried" <> wrote:
        On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 6:57 PM, <> wrote:
        > There are at least three different scenarios:
        >  1. Amplification only exists because of a server-side coding error,
        >     and fixing that error has no adverse impact on clients and
        >     requires no client-side changes. For example: for the protocol in
        >     question, the client simply never needs an unauthenticated UDP
        >     request to result in a larger UDP reply.
        >  2. Amplification is not caused by a coding error, but it is possible
        >     to reduce the amplification ratio without completely breaking the
        >     ability of clients to communicate with servers.
        >  3. Amplification is not caused by a coding error, and it is not
        >     possible to reduce the amplification ratio without completely
        >     breaking the ability of clients to communicate with servers. The
        >     only options are to mitigate attacks (as in
        > or to change
        >     the protocol.
        > If someone can request a CVE ID for any of these three scenarios,
        > should we encourage them to be most liberal with CVE ID requests in
        > scenario 1, and most conservative with CVE ID requests in scenario 3?
        > Or do we ideally want to enumerate everything, even a 1:1.1 ratio
        > that's baked into a protocol design, and can't be fixed without
        > changing every client and server?
        > Finally, do we want CVEs for all types of amplification, or only
        > amplification that can be used for DoS attacks against unrelated third
        > parties? For example, there's a class of amplification issues
        > affecting automated error reporting. This can exist in server-side
        > code in which exception handlers (something like "constraint
        > violation: length_a > length_b") are able to send outbound network
        > traffic to a vendor's server. Here, there can be cases where an
        > attacker sends an unauthenticated hundred-byte packet to a customer's
        > server, and the customer's server then immediately sends a
        > million-byte system-health report to the vendor. The attacker
        > generally can repeat this, although there might be a rate limit.
        > Suppose that the customer wants to send these reports, and the vendor
        > wants to receive these reports, and (maybe?) the intervening ISPs can
        > handle the load. Would this be a CVE because of the huge amplification
        > ratio, or is amplification a CVE only in certain special cases?
        So some additional comments/criteria:
        1) can this actually be exploited in practice in a reasonable manner (e.g.
        a 1:1000 amplification I think we'd all agree is a realistic problem)
        2) is this being actively used in the wild to exploit systems or cause DoS
        situations? In the case of this IKEv1 issue it sounds like yes
        and my favorite "should this get a CVE test" question:
        3) can it be fixed in a way that still lets the service/clients work?
        If it can be fixed in a way that leaves the service/clients working ok then
        chances are the old behavior is not something we want to live with anymore
        and we need to get rid of it.
        > - --
        > CVE Assignment Team
        > M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
        > [ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
        > ]
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        Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
        PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
        Red Hat Product Security contact:

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