Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2016 18:47:53 +0200 From: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request - multiple ghostscript -dSAFER sandbox problems On Wed, 5 Oct 2016 09:13:03 -0700 Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...gle.com> wrote: > If you're using ImageMagick, I would recommend disabling the PS, EPS, > PDF and XPS coders in policy.xml. Applications like gimp, evince, > claws, and most other applications that generate thumbnails of PDF/PS > documents should probably not do so without a prompt (NOTE: A lot of > packages do this I was surprised to see evince in this list. It uses poppler for pdf and libspectre for postscript, so there seems to be no use of ghostscript (maybe in an older version). Also for claws the only use of ghostscript is in a plugin that's not enabled by default. While I agree that avoiding parsing for things like thumbnails should be tried I still wonder what the overall solution to this is. Because even if we avoid non-prompted ps parsing we still want to be able to parse PS files without code execution. Do you feel dSAFER could be secured or is this a loosing battle? -- Hanno Böck https://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: hanno@...eck.de GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42 Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped
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