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Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 11:45:33 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: GraphicsMagick 1.3.25 fixes some security issues

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> Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 20:50:23 -0500 (CDT)

> Yesterday GraphicsMagick 1.3.25 was released. It fixes several
> security issues:

> 1. A last instance of CVE-2016-2317 (heap buffer overflow) in the MVG
> rendering code (also impacts SVG). This problem was originally
> reported by Gustavo Grieco.

CVE does not support the concept of a different "instance" of an ID
number that has different affected versions. For the aspect of the
heap buffer overflow issue in MVG/SVG rendering that remained present
in the 1.3.24 release (and was not fixed until 1.3.25), use
CVE-2016-7446.

This should be considered a clarification to the following NEWS
excerpts:

   http://www.graphicsmagick.org/NEWS.html#may-30-2016
   1.3.24 (May 30, 2016)
   SVG: Fixed heap and stack buffer overflows, as well as segmentation
   violations (CVE-2016-2317 and CVE-2016-2318).

   http://www.graphicsmagick.org/NEWS.html#september-5-2016
   1.3.25 (September 5, 2016)
   SVG/MVG: Fix another case of CVE-2016-2317 (heap buffer overflow)
   in the MVG rendering code (also impacts SVG).


> 2. A possible heap overflow of the EscapeParenthesis() function.
> While I was not able to reproduce it for myself, the implementation is
> replaced with a different algorithm. This problem was reported by
> Gustavo Grieco.

Use CVE-2016-7447.


> 3. The Utah RLE reader did not validate that header information was
> reasonable given the file size and so it could cause huge memory
> allocations and/or consume huge amounts of CPU. This problem was
> reported by Agostino Sarubbo.

Use CVE-2016-7448.


> 4. The TIFF reader had a bug pertaining to use of TIFFGetField() when
> a 'count' value is returned. The bug caused a heap read overflow (due
> to using strlcpy() to copy a possibly unterminated string) which could
> allow an untrusted file to crash the software.

>> Fix heap buffer read overflow while copying sized TIFF attributes.

>> http://hg.code.sf.net/p/graphicsmagick/code/rev/eb58028dacf5

>>> https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/08/23/graphicsmagick-two-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-readtiffimage-tiff-c/
>>> https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/09/07/graphicsmagick-null-pointer-dereference-in-magickstrlcpy-utility-c/

>>>> The problem was due to the definition of strlcpy() in that it is 
>>>> supposed to return the number of characters which would have been 
>>>> copied if the destination buffer was large enough. To satisfy this 
>>>> requirement, strlcpy() needs to continue scanning memory until it 
>>>> encounters a null byte in memory.
>>>> 
>>>> The strlcpy() function has very nice properties but this weakness is 
>>>> something that developers need to be aware of.

Use CVE-2016-7449 for all of these reported TIFF problems. The
ultimate vulnerability was use of:

  strlcpy(attribute,text,Min(sizeof(attribute),(count+1)));

three times in coders/tiff.c, where strlcpy is not an appropriate
function choice for this type of scenario of untrusted-data copying.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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