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Date: Mon,  5 Sep 2016 17:57:59 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: nathan.van.gheem@...ne.org
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: Plone multiple vulnerabilities

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> All of these vulnerabilities have been patched with the hotfix release
> package https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830 and are being
> incorporated upstream.

> 1. *filesystem information leak*: https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830/filesystem-information-leak
> 
> Managers had the ability to find read files from the file system that the
> system user running the plone process had access to

>> By using relative paths and guessing locations on a server Plone is
>> installed on, an attacker can read data from a target server that the
>> process running plone has permission to read. The attacker needs
>> administrator privileges on the Plone site to perform this attack.

Use CVE-2016-7135.


> 2. *Non-Persistent XSS in Plone forms*: https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830/non-persistent-xss-in-plone-forms
> 
> z3c.form will currently accept data from GET requests when the form is
> supposed to be POST. This allows a user to inject a potential XSS attack
> into a form. With certain widgets in Plone admin forms, the input is
> expected to be safe and can cause a reflexive XSS attack. Additionally,
> there is potential for an attack that will trick a user into saving a
> persistent XSS.

Use CVE-2016-7136 for the entire "accept data from GET requests when
the form is supposed to be POST" issue, which apparently has security
relevance for two different reasons ("reflexive XSS" and "saving a
persistent XSS").


> 3. *open redirection*:  https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830/open-redirection-in-plone
> 
> In multiple places, Plone blindly uses the referer header to redirect a
> user to the next page after a particular action. An attacker could utilize
> this to draw a user into a redirection attack.

Use CVE-2016-7137.


> 4. *Non-Persistent XSS in Plone*: https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830/non-persistent-xss-in-plone-1
> 
> Plone's URL checking infrastructure includes a method for checking if URLs
> valid and located in the Plone site. By passing javascript into this
> specially crafted url, XSS can be achieved.

Use CVE-2016-7138.


> 5. *Non-persistent XSS in Plone*:
> https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830/non-persistent-xss-in-plone
> 
> Plone has unescaped user input in a page template that is open to XSS.

Use CVE-2016-7139. (There were two issues numbered "5" in the
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/05/4 post.)


> 5. *Non-Persistent XSS in Plone Zope Management(ZMI)*:
> https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20160830/non-persistent-xss-in-zope2
> 
> In multiple places, Zope2's ZMI pages do not properly escape user input

Use CVE-2016-7140. (There were two issues numbered "5" in the
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/05/4 post.)

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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