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Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2016 17:24:40 +0200
From: Sebastian Pipping <>
Subject: Re: expat hash collision fix too predictable?

On 04.06.2016 16:54, wrote:
>> Please confirm that using CVE-2012-6702 for consequences of
>> "unanticipated internal calls to srand" is what you intended.
> Yes, we confirm that. (They are unanticipated both because of
> thread-safety concerns, and because it's possible for an application
> to have an important dependency on srand being called exactly once.)
>> The hash DoS vulnerability CVE-2012-0876 was fixed to some extend in
>> Expat 2.1.0, commit e3e81a6d
>> ...
>> The next release of Expat will not do internal calls to srand (or rand)
>> any more but extract and use entropy from other sources.
>> ...
>> I suppose hash initialization with (too little /) second-based
>> entropy still is part of the original CVE-2012-0876 (or the same again).
> Use CVE-2016-5300 for the separate issue in which the original choices
> of entropy source and RNG did not properly address the possibility of
> a successful hash DoS attack. In other words, the code changes (in the
> next release) to fix CVE-2016-5300 are needed because the original fix
> for CVE-2012-0876 was insufficient. (We use separate CVE IDs when
> follow-on work is needed to complete the solution to the same original
> vulnerability finding.)

Excellent, thank you!



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