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Date: Sun, 29 May 2016 14:46:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: fernando@...l-life.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: libgd - gdCtxPrintf memory leak

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> https://github.com/libgd/libgd/issues/211
> 
> length from the failed vsnprintf attempt to copy more than 8000 chars
> on a 4096 buffer ... libgd returns this length as is and PHP prints
> more information from memory than it should.

> https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4dc1a2d7931017d3625f2d7cff70a17ce58b53b4
> 
> xbm: avoid stack overflow (read) with large names #211
> 
> We use the name passed in to printf into a local stack buffer which is
> limited to 4000 bytes. So given a large enough value, lots of stack
> data is leaked.

Use CVE-2016-5116.


> PHP devs marked it as a "not a bug" because the bundled version of
> libgd with PHP 5.5 is not vulnerable, however using PHP with
> systemwide libgd is a common practice.

For purposes of CVE ID assignment, we do not feel that it's necessary
to suggest a decision about whether this must also be considered a
vulnerability in any PHP 5.5.x releases.
4dc1a2d7931017d3625f2d7cff70a17ce58b53b4 indicates that it's an
upstream bug, and the bug has plausible security relevance in some
contexts (which might be contexts involving integration of libgd and
PHP, or might be non-PHP contexts).

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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