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Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 16:13:30 +0100
From: Lorenz Quack <quack.lorenz@...il.com>
To: users@...d.apache.org, dev@...d.apache.org,
 "security@...che.org" <security@...che.org>,
 oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [CVE-2016-3094] Apache Qpid Java Broker denial of service
 vulnerability

CVE-2016-3094: Apache Qpid Java Broker denial of service vulnerability

Severity: Important

Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation

Versions Affected: Qpid Java Broker versions 6.0.0, 6.0.1, and 6.0.2

Description: A malformed authentication attempt may cause the broker to
terminate.  The Qpid Java Broker supports a number of configurable
authentication providers each supporting various SASL mechanisms. Some
mechanisms need (or can be configured to accept) plain-text passwords
being sent to the Broker (using the SASL "PLAIN" mechanism).  Where the
broker has been configured to allow plain-text passwords for authentication
it is possible for a client to send a malformed authentication attempt 
which
will lead the broker to terminate due to an uncaught Exception.
Brokers configured to use authentication from the "PlainPasswordFile",
"SimpleLDAP", or "Base64MD5PasswordFile" providers are vulnerable if the
"PLAIN" mechanism is enabled (by default "PLAIN" will be disabled on
non-TLS ports, but enabled on TLS connections).

Mitigation: Users should upgrade their Qpid Java Broker to version 6.0.3 or
later.  If this is not possible, users can disable the PLAIN mechanism for
their authentication manager on versions 0.32 and later by adding 
"PLAIN" to
the list of disabledMechanisms on their authentication provider object.
Note that the SimpleLDAP authentication provider requires PLAIN and so this
work around does not apply there.

Credit: This issue was discovered by ´╗┐Alex Szczuczko of Red Hat, Inc.

References: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/QPID-7271

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