Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 12:25:39 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: huzaifas@...hat.com Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: null pointer deref in openslp, can be triggered remotely -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 > return value from malloc isn't checked Our guess is that this probably wasn't an intentional design choice, and thus it's a security-related bug for some deployments. Use CVE-2016-4912. > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1329295 The oss-security message and the rhbz document seem to describe the impact in different ways, i.e., "Basically return value from malloc isn't checked ... This can be triggered remotely by sending a large number of requests, which could possibly lead malloc to fail at one point, causing crash via null pointer deref" versus "A remote attacker could potentially deplete the memory of the server." For purposes of CVE, this type of scenario is often not interpreted as two independent problems. Roughly speaking, it is interpreted as "The unchecked malloc return value is the primary problem. This problem becomes reachable for reasons that aren't fully described, but those reasons might involve a design limitation in which the memory consumption of requests is not strictly controlled." http://www.openslp.org/doc/html/UsersGuide/Security.html says "The OpenSLP daemon (slpd) must run as root initially in order to bind to the well known SLP port. However, slpd will relinquish root privileges and suid() to the daemon user (if it exists)." Thus, maybe the affected code is running as root with large or unbounded resource limits in some situations. > Because of the way memory works on modern linux systems, this one seems > to be difficult to exploit Maybe there is a relevant non-Linux case? http://www.openslp.org/doc/html/faq.html says "the OpenSLP code has proven to be very portable. It currently works on many operating systems including: Linux, BSD, Solaris, Tru64, HPUX, UnixWare, OSR5, and Win32." Finally, although perhaps not related to the issue of whether a CVE ID should exist, that Security.html page says "If you find a security hole in OpenSLP, please bring it to the attention of the OpenSLP maintainer" and names John Calcote. Possibly Red Hat could do this upstream notification if that hasn't already happened. - -- CVE Assignment Team M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJXPJaSAAoJEHb/MwWLVhi2h4cQAJmkQyaRT0i7LKVxxfP54FCK PPU79sWFvARo2g9W8WusHKaOFM/ebXR2FdgLOBwIxsiJ6jp7zbupgOG5t8n5T/s2 FXIgpiYUjgw04wlqEVcWIC64wYX+AiJZ3qAA2L1p69XOBz1Be0x3ngA3H6+w+i+z o4049/nEisclSGGzAZVMxO2/hycsJwtV5LlZmMZgcMfY+9ddwm/1j84JSTjT930s IAZxFdyymQAKGllQS8qRd3pmVVIRruDW7BhxuuzbZjRukgmExxwq7kkQ1JsQhrA+ VlQOR3AVV9oVVQMwwW5hDP9c8Fom2DnRxOkJduxvgBuUtACDlfsNUcncG68hBnJG skBvJ9A/4jDtsQGox19UAwJcsknn3O1aE138IbPu49AfUwUNFJr/iqJAHkAoxpw6 yz6Lmb5Z7fGWQlJzFzbHS/f3/F9TNjuwet75krGO1FJl9bBJSZ/agy++x/a5fyLG BB4eFVLhTu+b4cdQ0+08sbiSyf0eu5ro2527w4tyrj8P6pNVca3rS2BQTCiGgcBl 3kIcJ73g1KlUcJ0z3uIQWhut9A4qAm/xPV1fKNllcp6xDbX6N/CThPHWiMm70ary 8GhlVsTfjXkw+hMj9zD0jVNO64rHsodcFpoQQ3mtityguTuLY8KangerYE0E6Ztj cqBtWstYfr4XjyyVazC1 =/rdk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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