Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 08:29:40 -0500 (CDT) From: Bob Friesenhahn <bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: GraphicsMagick Response To "ImageTragick" [ This is a re-post of what was sent to the GM announcements list ] This the GraphicsMagick project response to the unfortunate list of ImageMagick exploits listed on the web site at https://imagetragick.com/. While GraphicsMagick forked from ImageMagick in 2002, it is reasonable to expect that much of the internal operation and architecture is still similar. In fact, some of the claimed exploits (or similar) are relevant to GraphicsMagick. Based on the current issues described, this is how GraphicsMagick fares: 1. CVE-2016-3714 - Insufficient shell characters filtering GraphicsMagick is not susceptible to remote code execution except if gnuplot is installed (because gnuplot executes shell commands). Gnuplot-shell based shell exploits are possible without a gnuplot file being involved although gnuplot invokes the shell. To fix this, the "gplt" entry in the delegates.mgk file must be removed. 2. CVE-2016-3718 - SSRF GraphicsMagick has always supported HTTP and FTP URL requests from the context of the executing process if it is linked with libxml2. There is no sandboxing or policy to determine which HTTP and FTP URLs should be allowed/denied because they should only be available from outside the system, or in the public space outside a "firewall". 3. CVE-2016-3715 - File deletion While the syntax is different from ImageMagick, GraphicsMagick does support a file specification syntax "tmp:" which causes the input file to be deleted after it is read. This has limited use to hand off responsibility for a temporary file to another process in order to assure that the temporary file will be deleted once it is no longer needed. This feature will removed since it is not actually necessary any more. 4. CVE-2016-3716 - File moving This is a two-factor attack and is actually file copying. It is not successful using GraphicsMagick. MSL is an XML-based "script" format which should never be allowed to be submitted and invoked by an untrusted party. 5. CVE-2016-3717 - Local file read GraphicsMagick supports a "txt:" file specification syntax which enables rendering all the lines of a text file as an image. There is also a "label:" file specification syntax which is capable of rendering only the first line of a file. Files ending with extension ".txt" are automatically rendered into an image. The main concern with this is that sensitive data in a text file might become rendered as an image on a web site. Using an uploaded manual page with file extension ".man" or by reading with "man:filename", the 'man' delegate can be used to render any file on the system into Postscript if 'groff' is installed. To resolve these concerns, several patches which should apply across most GraphicsMagick 1.3.XX releases have been developed and are attached: 1. Remove automatic detection/execution of MVG based on file header or file extension. [disable-mvg-ext.patch] 2. Remove the ability to cause an input file to be deleted based on a filename specification. [disable-tmp-magick-prefix.patch] 3. Improve the safety of delegates.mgk by removing gnuplot support, removing manual page support, and by adding -dSAFER to all ghostscript invocations. [delegates-safer.patch] 4. Sanity check the MVG image primitive filename argument to assure that "magick:" prefix strings will not be interpreted. Please note that this patch will break intentional uses of magick prefix strings in MVG and so some MVG scripts may fail. We will search for a more flexible solution. [image-sanity-check.patch] Please address any concerns to me (Bob Friesenhahn <bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us>). -- Bob Friesenhahn bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us, http://www.simplesystems.org/users/bfriesen/ GraphicsMagick Maintainer, http://www.GraphicsMagick.org/ View attachment "delegates-safer.patch" of type "text/plain" (8361 bytes) View attachment "disable-mvg-ext.patch" of type "text/plain" (368 bytes) View attachment "disable-tmp-magick-prefix.patch" of type "text/plain" (514 bytes) View attachment "image-sanity-check.patch" of type "text/plain" (1220 bytes)
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