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Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2016 19:53:03 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: carnil@...ian.org
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: Roundcube: XSS issue in SVG image handling and protection for download urs against CSRF

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> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/wiki/Changelog
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/releases

> Fix XSS issue in SVG images handling (#4949):
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/issues/4949
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/40d7342dd9c9bd2a1d613edc848ed95a4d71aa18
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/7bbefdb63b12e2344cf1cb87aeb6e3933b4063e0

Use CVE-2015-8864 for the issue that was fixed by these commits. Use
CVE-2016-4068 for the remaining SVG XSS issues that were not fixed
(i.e., the SVG XSS issues that remain present in versions 1.0.9,
1.1.5, and 1.2-rc), as described in the
https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/40d7342dd9c9bd2a1d613edc848ed95a4d71aa18#commitcomment-15294218
comment:

   thomascube commented on 40d7342 Jan 6, 2016

   Good start! Removing script nodes, however, is just the beginning.
   XSS code can also be in node attributes like onclick, onmouseover,
   href="javascript:, etc. or even in CSS url() as we learned with
   HTML messages.

   So traversing the entire DOM is probably necessary to provide
   protection that goes beyond the one example we received.


> Protect download urls against CSRF using unique request tokens (#4957):
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/issues/4957
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/4a408843b0ef816daf70a472a02b78cd6073a4d5
> https://github.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/commit/699af1e5206ed9114322adaa3c25c1c969640a53

Use CVE-2016-4069. This is not a typical type of impact associated
with CSRF; however, it is still probably best to categorize this as a
CSRF issue, not an SSRF issue.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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