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Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2016 18:49:02 +0300
From: yumkam@...il.com (Yuriy M. Kaminskiy)
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 172 (CVE-2016-3158, CVE-2016-3159) - broken AMD FPU FIP/FDP/FOP leak workaround

Xen.org security team <security@....org> writes:

>      Xen Security Advisory CVE-2016-3158,CVE-2016-3159 / XSA-172
>                               version 3
>
>               broken AMD FPU FIP/FDP/FOP leak workaround
>
> UPDATES IN VERSION 3
> ====================
>
> Public release.
>
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION
> =================
>
> There is a workaround in Xen to deal with the fact that AMD CPUs don't
> load the x86 registers FIP (and possibly FCS), FDP (and possibly FDS),
> and FOP from memory (via XRSTOR or FXRSTOR) when there is no pending
> unmasked exception.  (See XSA-52.)
>
> However, this workaround does not cover all possible input cases.
> This is because writes to the hardware FSW.ES bit, which the current
> workaround is based on, are ignored; instead, the CPU calculates
> FSW.ES from the pending exception and exception mask bits.  Xen
> therefore needs to do the same.
>
> Note that part of said workaround was the subject of XSA-52.
>
> This can leak register contents from one guest to another.  The
> registers in question are the FPU instruction and data pointers and
> opcode.
>
> IMPACT
> ======
>
> A malicious domain is able to obtain address space usage and timing
> information, about another domain, at a fairly low rate.
>
> The leaked address information might be used to help defeat address
> space randomisation in order to enable another attack.  The leaked
> address and timing information forms a low-bandwidth covert channel
> which might be used to gain information about the operation of a
> target guest.
>
> The affected FPU facility would not normally be used by cryptographic
> operations, as it does not provide cryptographically-relevant SIMD
> functions.

For the record: non-SIMD FPU is sometimes used in cryptography: e.g. nacl
library[1] contains poly1305 and curve25519 implementation for
x86_{32,64} that actively uses FPU (but, unless I missed something or
misunderstood issue, it is likely not affected [attacker won't have
anything from leaked instruction or data pointers, as code flow is
not dependent on any secret data]).

(But if someone used similar technique, but was less accurate about
avoiding *all* secret-dependent branches/addresses, they could be
affected).

[1] https://nacl.cr.yp.to/

> It appears to us very unlikely that the leak might directly compromise
> sensitive information such as cryptographic keys, although (without
> knowledge of the guest software) this cannot be ruled out.  (This is
> notwithstanding the contrary statement in `Impact' in XSA-52.)
>
> VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
> ==================
>
> Xen versions 4.0 and onwards are vulnerable.  Any kind of guest can
> exploit the vulnerability.
>
> The vulnerability is exposed only on AMD x86 systems.  Intel and ARM
> systems do not expose this vulnerability.
>
> Both PV and HVM guests are affected.
>
> MITIGATION
> ==========
>
> The vulnerability can be avoided if the guest kernel is controlled by
> the host rather than guest administrator, provided that further steps
> are taken to prevent the guest administrator from loading code into
> the kernel (e.g. by disabling loadable modules etc) or from using
> other mechanisms which allow them to run code at kernel privilege.
>
> On Xen versions 4.3 and earlier, turning off XSAVE support via the
> "no-xsave" hypervisor command line option will avoid the vulnerability.
>
> On Xen versions 4.4 and onwards there is no other known mitigation.
>
> CREDITS
> =======
>
> This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich from SUSE.
>
> RESOLUTION
> ==========
>
> Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.
>
> xsa172.patch           xen-unstable, Xen 4.6.x, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x
> xsa172-4.3.patch       Xen 4.3.x
>
> $ sha256sum xsa172*
> f18282fcb794b8772bc3af51d56860050071bd62a5a909b8f2fc2018e2958154  xsa172.patch
> 6aac179620afcdbdab041163239019bc35b0e243f3bd16673caaec7d5a4d97ec  xsa172-4.3.patch
> $
>
> NOTE REGARDING CVE
> ==================
>
> CVE-2016-3158 is for the code change which is required for all
> versions (but which is sufficient only on Xen 4.3.x, and insufficient
> on later versions).  Ie for the second hunk in xsa172.patch (the only
> hunk in xsa172-4.3.patch), which patches the function xrstor.
>
> CVE-2016-3159 is for the code change which is applicable for later
> versions only, but which must always be combined with the code change
> for CVE-2016-3158.  Ie for the first hunk in xsa172.patch, which
> patches the function fpu_fxrstor.
>
> DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
> =========================
>
> Deployment of the PATCH or the TRUSTED KERNEL MITIGATION (or others
> which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even
> on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
> administrators.
>
> However deployment of the "no-xsave" MITIGATION is NOT permitted
> (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and
> used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project
> Security Issues Predisclosure List).  Specifically, deployment on
> public cloud systems is NOT permitted.
>
> This is because such a host configuration change would be guest-visible
> which could lead to the rediscovery of the vulnerability.
>
> But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
> members of the predisclosure list).
>
> Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
> patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
> Team.
>
>
> (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
> post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
> is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
> oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)
>
> For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
> consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
>   http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html

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