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Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 16:26:48 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: amaris@...hat.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: Heap buffer overflow in pcretest

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> Heap-based buffer overread caused by specially crafted input triggering
> infinite loop in pcretest.c 

Can you clarify the threat model for an infinite loop caused by the
pcretest.c source code?

Our understanding is that pcretest and pcre2test are standalone
command-line programs; they are not normally linked into applications
that use the PCRE library. This type of bug in pcretest or pcre2test
might not have any common associated use case in which an unattended
process receives untrusted patterns, and uses a huge amount of CPU time
before anyone notices. In other words, a person who has any awareness
of running pcretest or pcre2test could observe the long run time, and
could apparently recover from the bug by removing the problematic
patterns from the set of input patterns, and then running the program
again. Obviously, some infinite-loop issues have CVE ID assignments
but they are almost always issues in which the use case is
realistically unattended (kernel, daemons, CGI scripts, web browsers,
network-monitoring tools, general-purpose library code, etc.).

If a pattern can result in code execution when pcretest or pcre2test
is executed with untrusted input, then a CVE ID could be considered.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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