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Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2016 23:19:10 +0000
From: Darren Martyn <darren.martyn@...hosresearch.co.uk>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Address Sanitizer local root
Hi List,
Figured I would add this to the thread to keep it amusing.
Here is a fully functioning local root by clobbering /etc/ld.so.preload
instead of /etc/shadow (which breaks things spectacularly). I am using a
fairly messy "symlink spray"/"symlink carpet bombing" technique.
Simply point it at a setuid-root binary compiled with asan and away it
goes.
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhSIm3auQMk
PoC Code: https://gist.github.com/0x27/9ff2c8fb445b6ab9c94e
Development/Testing was done on a Debian 8.3 VM that was last updated
last week.
Now, I wonder - what can actually be done to mitigate against this,
besides "don't use ASAN in production"?
Is there something that can be done ASAN-side?
Because due to how ld.so.preload is parsed so, uh, forgivingly, all the
attacker needs to control is one line in the output file. Could it check
for symlinks before writing the log?
Regards,
Darren.
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