Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 12:28:00 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 154 (CVE-2016-2270) - x86: inconsistent cachability flags on guest mappings -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2016-2270 / XSA-154 version 3 x86: inconsistent cachability flags on guest mappings UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Clarify cumbersome Resolution wording. The patch now adds a command line option to overcome the possible performance regression. Add patch backports. Clarify origin of assertion (at start of patch description) that inconsistent cacheability is a problem only for mmio pages. Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Multiple mappings of the same physical page with different cachability setting can cause problems. While one category (risk of using stale data) affects only guests themselves (and hence avoiding this can be left for them to control), the other category being Machine Check exceptions can be fatal to entire hosts. According to the information we were able to gather, only mappings of MMIO pages may surface this second category, but even for them there were cases where the hypervisor did not properly enforce consistent cachability. IMPACT ====== A malicious guest administrator might be able to cause a reboot, denying service to the entire host. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Xen versions are affected. Only x86 guests given control over some physical device can trigger this vulnerability. x86 systems are vulnerable. ARM systems are not vulnerable. The vulnerability depends on the system response to mapping the same memory with different cacheability. On some systems this is harmless; on others, depending on CPU and chipset, it may be fatal. MITIGATION ========== Not handing physical devices to guests will also avoid this issue. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== We believe that the attached patch fixes the issue. However, no formal description of CPU behaviour in particular use cases has been provided by Intel. There has been no response from AMD. We are aware of a potential performance regression with this patch on some systems - even if no hardware passthrough is configured. This is due to the behaviour of some drivers and peripherals that is beyond the scope of this security fix. The patch adds a command line option "mmio-relax" to overcome this possible regression for Domain 0 or all para-virtual guests. Note however that enabling this workaround will reinstate the security issue these patches aim to address. xsa154.patch xen-unstable xsa154-4.6.patch Xen 4.6.x xsa154-4.5.patch Xen 4.5.x xsa154-4.4.patch Xen 4.4.x xsa154-4.3.patch Xen 4.3.x $ sha256sum xsa154* bbe7fba38ee30c00ef850fa6419c769e88b5669164d447f50b1ebbe333573152 xsa154.patch 011a4e33c0e476c52fe44253d50e01a1185948fd1b2a8e645274b25da6030d71 xsa154-4.3.patch 92d475bbc344127faa4f0183a9ccca9e975c7d24eb5772bf0a0a0a2e019144c6 xsa154-4.4.patch b13737e71f22185b94ab25c07afd521add1a7e3886326c719d5df4d42f3f87f4 xsa154-4.5.patch eec88c2a57466f83a81844cb7025f70c2b671d07a75d85487d4ed73cdabbb020 xsa154-4.6.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patch described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. However deployment of the mitigations described above is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because the configuration change would be visible to the guest, which could lead to the rediscovery of the vulnerability. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJWxGayAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ9KwH/3z+9b7OjgpuIsOf0giZ5y99 yKoORWxQjcosYLQRQXvH62xtz0xRng+E3p+MeUm2qPUUuHFiqxSpZOAvW61C6DQL l5KNNHlIjWB3N0YVmvgRbf3WMbeX1DCsEJEIFxZUQQs3fgGAiOfIEOwRL2FIhJ5Y wP/z59fCuWs5lHoV0iAY3gkZHDd09JspCRQq8UGAc+X5jHF6fIOhUjZCS9KRQMJ5 p69ysdMj96fY5eKqwka/EXzvKMJUsQ42u5RQoYR5FhLx1UBi2otdcdbloKNseksA 7Wbf6j8Mz9NWVhvdZtnR/CNH8m5V7d78HsnGv7zNQCiMW+wg/k53yzHcw550P4w= =5V3D -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ]
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