Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 12:42:34 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 166 - ioreq handling possibly susceptible to multiple read issue -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory XSA-166 version 2 ioreq handling possibly susceptible to multiple read issue UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Single memory accesses in source code can be translated to multiple ones in machine code by the compiler, requiring special caution when accessing shared memory. Such precaution was missing from the hypervisor code inspecting the state of I/O requests sent to the device model for assistance. Due to the offending field being a bitfield, it is however believed that there is no issue in practice, since compilers, at least when optimizing (which is always the case for non-debug builds), should find it more expensive to extract the bit field value twice than to keep the calculated value in a register. IMPACT ====== This vulnerability is exposed to malicious device models. In conventional Xen systems this means the qemu which service an HVM domain. On such systems this vulnerability can only be exploited if the attacker has gained control of the device model qemu via another vulnerability. Privilege escalation, host crash (Denial of Service), and leaked information all cannot be excluded. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Xen versions are affected. Only x86 variants of Xen are susceptible. ARM variants are not affected. Only HVM guests expose this vulnerability. MITIGATION ========== Running only PV guests will avoid this issue. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk of Oracle and Jan Beulich of SUSE while investigating the issues arising from XSA-155. XSA-155 was discovered by Felix Wilhelm of ERNW. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa166.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.6.x xsa166-4.5.patch Xen 4.5.x xsa166-4.4.patch Xen 4.4.x xsa166-4.3.patch Xen 4.3.x $ sha256sum xsa166* 740a28a69524e966ab77f9f5e45067aa7ba2d32ea69b1d3c4b9bf0c86212ad0a xsa166.patch 109a9eb132d712a56a7ca81214fff3952868a39206eb34f66f5b2265e680b9fc xsa166-4.3.patch d63261ca2d40e2723a4f3c94665cc120e0ea488200eebb08c7aa07e1c1a35d42 xsa166-4.4.patch d5dddce37c644d35ef52ff7230f83bf0969b6b4db9b586241f5f5bd0dc631096 xsa166-4.5.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html NOTE REGARDING SHORT EMBARGO ============================ This issue was encountered by the Security Team during investigations of the scope and impact of XSA-155. Accordingly XSA-166 is embargoed and the embargo will end at the same time as that of XSA-155. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJWcqzCAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZPRIIAIkXhtZYi1ro+T74PMote55o npXKgR9tvXOokj3O1IsYfzHQnOiX3kQmmGmSXg5Hh/sYxAQIgqn2f9Zf/K+6gx8j Rd+0QrbhekG7+uA3TrGNtNdBDPevAcKE2xkzGZ7OZknE7Ch9WKua3VtjlY0pG9jr 8PUPE/NZ//MSd9Ds2uPB6G2zaoqFG6oGMgqdYs3zwLM52FR1/VlTzKLZ7sh3mPeK rPO1f1Agn7mFVnSbO0EkAYx++Mr3rv/w2M1qnK0cQk6T9l6Cg6qKzdV+iTV95CNo QxWLsm26c4YsRPIU1gBgHoPxi8hGwZThInSY8j8MH0Ed1xV3bPm1HqirrafpHHA= =Fovo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ] [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ]
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