Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 12:02:16 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 159 (CVE-2015-8339,CVE-2015-8340) - XENMEM_exchange error handling issues -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2015-8339,CVE-2015-8340 / XSA-159 version 4 XENMEM_exchange error handling issues UPDATES IN VERSION 4 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Error handling in the operation may involve handing back pages to the domain. This operation may fail when in parallel the domain gets torn down. So far this failure unconditionally resulted in the host being brought down due to an internal error being assumed. This is CVE-2015-8339. Furthermore error handling so far wrongly included the release of a lock. That lock, however, was either not acquired or already released on all paths leading to the error handling sequence. This is CVE-2015-8340. IMPACT ====== A malicious guest administrator may be able to deny service by crashing the host or causing a deadlock. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Xen versions from at least 3.2 onwards are vulnerable. Older versions have not been inspected. MITIGATION ========== The vulnerability can be avoided if the guest kernel is controlled by the host rather than guest administrator, provided that further steps are taken to prevent the guest administrator from loading code into the kernel (e.g. by disabling loadable modules etc) or from using other mechanisms which allow them to run code at kernel privilege. In Xen HVM, controlling the guest's kernel would involve locking down the bootloader. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Julien Grall of Citrix and Jan Beulich of SUSE. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. xsa159.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.6.x, Xen 4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x, Xen 4.3.x $ sha256sum xsa159* 05c35871c1430e9cfdbee049411b23fca6c64c5bc9f112d7508afe5cbd289cef xsa159.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJWZr8HAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZXp8IAMNhe/G7435bJNiwMbWIT6vt 8piJPArKxhd3yohEiAx0wG7BXTQ7ockAKFCjdSL8ZGPQuaxwuYrdm4wH14ucxRY6 wgHyU2766g5VuP1bJ1eU/XxZpNGWCqDQaaMzbwQLKVO7rhsZc14txY2nYFZ5cvLT nMDR8rfcNSeGMSCzg9vrdnFhmmslT797fgRXrCnZ2+bEDerTiYu5nDlS+aIZPiSt WwKbiYN/RJLIo4EThvYfPdbm9SPeSdNYNUws2MVkl50x2h4hm33eqKDNxAtUMgDq CZzHQGCMjAtrhK/64AQePiXRHO4SHYbX4FmeO9Yrkbgf971PqpEYed79UJ2a0SA= =sIvq -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ]
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