Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 07:15:53 +0100 From: Tim Brown <tmb@...35.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: BusyBox tar directory traversal On Thursday 22 October 2015 22:40:29 Robert Watson wrote: > Apologies if I'm naive but... since /tmp is world writable, how is this a > vulnerability? The permissions on /tmp having nothing at all to do with this, not sure why you brought that up. With most archiving tools, there is an expectation that unpacking will involve writing only to the current directory and below and/or a user specified directory and below. This breaks that assumption because the unpacker may create a symlink to a location outside of the directory which later may then be followed when further files are unpacked. Depending on the user permissions, this could lead to sensitive files being overwritten. Even if the unpacker validates the path it is writing to is as described, the validation fails to account for the potential presence of symbolic link files that point elsewhere. Tim -- Tim Brown <mailto:tmb@...35.com> Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (820 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ