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Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 18:55:06 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@...thhorseman.net>
To: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>, oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Prime example of a can of worms
On Thu 2015-10-22 01:09:16 -0400, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> Having a large pool of known good primes would be easier for them to use I
> suspect. Sadly we can't let perfect be the enemy of the good, or in this
> case the "not completely terrible".
a large pool of known-good primes doesn't help so much, particularly for
the embedded case -- peers that are offered a group need to be able to
easily verify that the group is strong. embedded devices simply aren't
going to carry around a large list of well-vetted primes of short
length, but we could *maybe* convince them to carry around a shorter
list of well-vetted strong primes.
I'd rather see us increase the security margin for a set of well-vetted
standard groups than ask people to make implementations that can't
determine whether they're in a reasonable group or not.
--dkg
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