Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 14:56:50 -0500 From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: security@...ntu.com, Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@...glemail.com> Subject: Re: CVE Request: BusyBox tar directory traversal On 2015-10-21 10:36:33, Tyler Hicks wrote: > Hello - The BusyBox implementation of tar will extract a symlink that > points outside of the current working directory and then follow that > symlink when extracting other files. This allows for a directory > traversal attack when extracting untrusted tarballs. I forgot to mention that I took a look at BusyBox's protections against directory traversal attacks while extracting files with absolute paths or dot dot ("..") components and it seems to sufficiently protect against those attacks. The function can be found here: http://git.busybox.net/busybox/tree/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c Tyler Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (820 bytes)
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