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Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 14:56:50 -0500
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: security@...ntu.com, Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@...glemail.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: BusyBox tar directory traversal

On 2015-10-21 10:36:33, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> Hello - The BusyBox implementation of tar will extract a symlink that
> points outside of the current working directory and then follow that
> symlink when extracting other files. This allows for a directory
> traversal attack when extracting untrusted tarballs.

I forgot to mention that I took a look at BusyBox's protections against
directory traversal attacks while extracting files with absolute paths
or dot dot ("..") components and it seems to sufficiently protect
against those attacks.

The function can be found here:

  http://git.busybox.net/busybox/tree/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c

Tyler

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