Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 15:06:28 -0500 From: Brad Knowles <brad@...b-internet.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Brad Knowles <brad@...b-internet.org>, CVE ID Requests <cve-assign@...re.org> Subject: Re: Prime example of a can of worms On Oct 18, 2015, at 11:06 PM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> wrote: > A small > number of fixed or standardized groups are used by millions > of servers; performing precomputation for a single 1024-bit > group would allow passive eavesdropping on 18% of popular > HTTPS sites, and a second group would allow decryption > of traffic to 66% of IPsec VPNs and 26% of SSH servers. I think this may be a bit of a slippery slope here. How many machines would have to be vulnerable for a given group to be considered big enough to be “weak” and therefore worth of having a CVE issued? Would that number be 1%? 5%? 10%? At what point is it more dangerous to generate your own DH groups on systems that do not have sufficient uptime, versus re-using an existing DH group that might be considered “weak”? There was a time when 1024-bit DH groups were considered sufficiently safe, and 2048-bit was overkill. At what point does 2048-bit become “weak” in the same way that 1024-bit is today? How many years in advance are we going to build into the system, so that we can have people “safely” transitioned off 2048-bit DH groups and onto whatever the next new thing is? I mean, NIST is having a hard enough time getting people to stop using MD-5, much less SHA-1. And if SHA-1 falls this year, how long before SHA-2 falls? -- Brad Knowles <brad@...b-internet.org> LinkedIn Profile: <http://tinyurl.com/y8kpxu> [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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