Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2015 10:25:30 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: me@...tinbull.ca Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: TOTP Replay Attack in Ruby library "devise-two-factor" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 > Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2015 11:55:41 -0400 > Given an attacker already knows a victim's credentials, they could > "shoulder surf" the victim's second factor device, obtaining the OTP, > and login with the known credentials & OTP within the current > time-step (a default 30 second window). This defeats two-factor > authentication for the duration of the time-step. This 2015-09-06 message is directly related to a discussion of CVE assignment here on 2015-06-22, but doesn't mention that that discussion had occurred. Specifically: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/06/22/2 From: cve-assign@...re.org devise-two-factor can potentially have a CVE ID. As you mentioned, the attack surface is somewhat narrow, and it might make more sense to see how the devise-two-factor vendor announces the update. For example, if the vendor makes a code change to prevent multiple submissions and describes the code change as resolving a vulnerability, then there can be a CVE ID. The vendor did all of that, so we're assigning CVE-2015-7225. [ relevant parts include 'to protect against "shoulder-surfing" attacks' in https://github.com/tinfoil/devise-two-factor/blob/master/UPGRADING.md and 'While a valid security issue, this is a very narrow vulnerability' in https://github.com/tinfoil/devise-two-factor/issues/45#issuecomment-139335608 ] - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJV+sz+AAoJEL54rhJi8gl5FkUQAIUNoqnHZHkc6ZY5OXkG1Si+ UIiPAUEtxTXe067zoZjEzqlsjzexzh0ld96XzD0kmfrCR0O/4tddpyX6n5Q7ooqI VrVp+UDJO36/qDW/ODlxjbJoWD02TdHlWd5gZVb4h7uBSKbj4PItDAMx5VGZbJgP msCoSOVG48odcGdbOKXR+Bb0zQQURq0s9Qxqwi28MT3IAXlyz9jjSrgyd7W4J87m +SrS+dL8gH22BA0rNI7UUNeCRpBOmUt9i1QPRRi9nmPjTmBtGZ1AxUXQj/VFTe1c fcwyvTHBsAslavhVEwbN2IzO+8ycuP55NVW90e2v2k977kHSTjiEpdJ8b3Hl7BtR 2Tu+uZjHIUvNoLznhag/+f9LL3yhxdpgPXlmYQNFeKcsaIxiXxaNF6zg8soRQDMi f0hMP8yfBkwzSVZY2xl1QeZyww00+RY45WvLPilH7fkoCZmsT3ftxfQkurNViFAU zCDyKmQIaHXIpcOrC9qLuWmSE02NB8Qod+XkBGOd1/tRDxzMBYoVSDabFfS3npBZ qDK13djTq8rZKhlXrzdeTrmW5RwDhZrZSrNcdAh140lIL9DwkD/6n/JAubfH68Gn uFGwgRSCUbNUP8nLJ97Rv81NHNP+XYcd+X3mHumJpPf/R94/dEwkAoi6ytQsE5pr s9eZT7jONl8mzpQL1Vzl =aeha -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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