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Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 07:50:58 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: rgbkrk@...il.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, khanam@...ibm.com, security@...thon.org
Subject: Re: CVE request: IPython CSRF validation
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Hash: SHA1
> Software name: IPython notebook
> Attack outcome: Possible remote execution
> Patches:
> 2.x:
> https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/a05fe052a18810e92d9be8c1185952c13fe4e5b0
> 3.x:
> https://github.com/ipython/ipython/commit/1415a9710407e7c14900531813c15ba6165f0816
>
> POST requests exposed via the IPython REST API are vulnerable to
> cross-site request forgery (CSRF). Web pages on different domains can make
> non-AJAX POST requests to known IPython URLs, and IPython will honor them.
> The user's browser will automatically send IPython cookies along with the
> requests.
Use CVE-2015-5607.
This part of the patch seems unusual, but we haven't researched it at all:
host = self.request.headers.get("Host")
origin = self.request.headers.get("Origin")
# If no header is provided, assume it comes from a script/curl.
# We are only concerned with cross-site browser stuff here.
if origin is None or host is None:
return True
Is this a case where it is safe to skip CSRF protection in all
situations where the client omits an Origin header?
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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