Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 22:32:53 -0300 From: "Ignacio R. Morelle" <shadowm2006@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: CVE request: Wesnoth authentication information disclosure Hello, We've found and fixed a bug in our software, "The Battle for Wesnoth", which allowed malicious users to obtain the contents of client-side files containing passphrases used for content server authentication. We would like to have a CVE id assigned to this issue if possible. Description: Wesnoth implements a text preprocessing language that is used in conjunction with its own game scripting language. It also has a built-in Lua interpreter and API. Both the Lua API and the preprocessor make use of the same function (filesystem::get_wml_location()) to resolve file paths so that only content from the user's data directory can be read. However, the function did not explicitly disallow files with the .pbl extension. The contents of these files could thus be stored in saved game files or even transmitted directly to other users in a networked game. Among the information that's compromised is a user-defined passphrase used to authenticate uploads to the game's content server. This issue was found by Toom Lõhmus, then verified and fixed by Ignacio R. Morelle. Bug report: * https://gna.org/bugs/?23504 - currently private to project members as it includes a sufficiently elaborate exploit proof of concept. Affected versions: * All existing versions up to and including 1.12.2 and 1.13.0. * 1.12.3 (tagged but not officially announced) contains a partial fix that only prevents inclusion of files with a lowercase extension. Patches: * Original fix for lowercase extensions only: https://github.com/wesnoth/wesnoth/commit/f8914468182e8d0a1551b430c0879ba236fe4d6d * More general, correct fix: https://github.com/wesnoth/wesnoth/commit/b2738ffb2fdd2550ececb74f76f75583c43c8b59 -- Regards Ignacio R. Morelle, Wesnoth developer and maintainer
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