Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2015 09:16:40 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: me@...tinbull.ca Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: MITM & Shoulder-surfing vuln in Ruby OTP/HOTP/TOTP library "ROPT" - ROTP -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > https://github.com/mdp/rotp/issues/44 > https://github.com/mdp/rotp/pull/45 As far as we can tell, ROTP is advertised as "A ruby library for generating one time passwords (HOTP & TOTP) according to RFC 4226 and RFC 6238." This applies to "generating." We did not find any documentation stating that the "verifier" complies with RFC 6238. Admittedly, it is plausible that many users expected that the verifier would comply with this RFC, just because this RFC was mentioned. The vendor's position (see the https://github.com/mdp/rotp/issues/44#issuecomment-113824151 comment) is, roughly, that this verifier behavior is outside the scope of the ROTP design, and that anyone who wants this verifier behavior needs to write code or obtain code elsewhere. Possibly a second issue is https://github.com/f3ndot/rotp/commit/a7ffd1b5aa60235ac197859619dd29753499a666. We might not understand this, but we think it essentially means that "if ROTP were to consume an OTP, then this should be done consistently for the current-timestamp case and the acceptable-past-timestamp case." So, we don't think that this is an independent concern. We don't think there can be a CVE ID for any aspect of the report recommending that the verifier comply with RFC 6238. We agree that it would be useful for the ROTP documentation to place some emphasis on the actual verifier behavior, to cover the scenario where a user guesses that full RFC compliance was intended, and later discovers that a "MUST NOT" condition isn't met. > NOTE: I have already sent a similar email to MITRE requesting a CVE > ID, but been advised to submit here as well (then cancel the request > to MITRE We aren't exactly sure what this means. The MITRE CVE team currently does not advise anyone to send messages to oss-security. The "already sent" apparently refers to a message from an hour earlier. Messages for us can be sent to either oss-security or to cve-assign@...re.org but should not be sent to both addresses. Of course, we are willing to accommodate the occasional case where someone accidentally sends to cve-assign@...re.org but actually wanted to make the information public immediately on oss-security. (Subject line modified to account for the "ROPT" typo.) - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVhriWAAoJEKllVAevmvmsBL0H/iF7pqv9Mi6IgR29G/L+77xx Uq+rSiqThEcm/DXyIJiRU9lFjwp+i+icPPp/1Tfz0QW2mXYSpwYuOWW6EtBwhLbJ VjiGSyGSvobvNbX6kX/t7P5zD+IwvnI3pUVbMssPpTdgW8XWmOL0pDetdb44IUgh YiXuwxWMBdkP5F06pYQAUpvk6UFW9Te5gM7JK2UVcI56Tuj5LKEe1owckbalSj9k E8CIS2LzGSWRuWls4widtmQnfBn3D6Nc2OKriGCmmfLsKbSXOaM8sjVjPv6LiV62 3RXhDHoVPHMa/hOHqCSbeD7m4az8m/oVz/yShDv2hCRBeXh49ojX6805/UGuiP4= =E1cO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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