Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 12:20:09 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: gcanalesb@...com Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Possible CVE Request: Multiple stack overflows in squashfs-tools and sasquatch -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > Sasquatch is an experimental fork of squashfs-tools. > I'm requesting a CVE number for this vulnerability, per project. CVE assignments typically cannot be done that way. > https://github.com/devttys0/sasquatch/pull/5 As far as we can tell, there are two independent types of problems: - "int bytes" is incorrect because the return value of SQUASHFS_FRAGMENT_BYTES can be larger than the maximum value of a signed int - pull/5 says "If we fix this by making the variable size_t, we run into an unrelated problem in which the stack VLA allocation of fragment_table_index can easily exceed RLIMIT_STACK" but actually RLIMIT_STACK can be exceeded regardless of the data type of the bytes variable We understand that the pull request is only intended to be an example code change, not a comprehensive code change to all affected functions. This type of fork situation can have up to six CVEs: 1 - all "int where size_t is correct" issues that occur only in squashfs-tools 2 - all "int where size_t is correct" issues that occur only in sasquatch 3 - all "int where size_t is correct" issues that occur in both squashfs-tools and sasquatch 4 - all "exceeding RLIMIT_STACK" issues that occur only in squashfs-tools 5 - all "exceeding RLIMIT_STACK" issues that occur only in sasquatch 6 - all "exceeding RLIMIT_STACK" issues that occur in both squashfs-tools and sasquatch We would guess that the most likely case is that only 3 and 6 are applicable, i.e., the code problems are found only in unsquash-1.c/unsquash-2.c/unsquash-3.c/unsquash-4.c and all of these files exist in both squashfs-tools and sasquatch. Is this correct? - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVgu8IAAoJEKllVAevmvms4iAH/2jSsPzoTZ4CPOCHDte6TuWr 1S02rSBvhaQ0HngavjC66y7EAdUK98SZpDeLwN9XP2o/jyhm8YMjcqgaJ/Kerf6s W1QhG8Bq3h4bLiGLOWNteqCt3YinB8KNAppqXI8/zpFWH9SSHaAu0EYp5bS6Pqvz ldan3rWvLCojwH/cfLWCPjUCi4dYPVN60x631WpH5Fg9ysLrlPLcFNpnBH17t+ul k9tHS1YSox3AfdMjN1snzPalwpXqc2Qz3AlmrmeB/4YGaW7D1+fAOIr2jKEbbTUN fk/7Nk86Keo2vp4nHavIwtuaYYB9g6AjP/nVsdzQAoITzz9yvwFp9xklHoUbtnM= =YsiJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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