Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2015 02:12:54 -0500 From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: P J P <ppandit@...hat.com> Cc: oss security list <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, cve-assign@...re.org Subject: Re: Re: CVE request Linux kernel: ns: user namespaces panic P J P <ppandit@...hat.com> writes: > +-- On Wed, 3 Jun 2015, cve-assign@...re.org wrote --+ > | We feel that this is best covered by two CVE IDs. The > | cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae issue seems to be about lack of > | state identification (i.e., the state is whether the path is mounted or > | unmounted), > > Not sure if it'd have security implications which an end user could use or > trigger. CC'ing upstream author Eric for any clarificaitons. The core issue is that a unprivileged user could call umount(MNT_DETACH) and in the right circumstances gain access to every file on essentially any filesystem in the mount namespace. So in a kernel with user namespaces enabled and you are running a sandbox like docker that has a real root user inside. That root user could with a little work remove every ro bind mount on top of proc. Such as /proc/sys/. Allowing a user that simply has uid 0 and no caps access to do all kinds of interesting things. The bug fix modifies umount(MNT_DETACH) to keeps mounts covered even after the actual umount. That changes makes it unsafe for copy_tree to run on an unmounted mount tree because one of it's assumptions is violated. Which assumption I do not remember at this late hour. But I think it was something bad enough to cause a crash. I can not recall all of the details when reading through the code at this late hour. Previously copy_tree on an unmounted tree would just return a single struct mount as all of the connections would have been cleanly removed. So I believe cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae prevents a difficult to trigger crash if you have e0c9c0afd2fc958ffa34b697972721d81df8a56f applied. e0c9c0afd2fc958ffa34b697972721d81df8a56f mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected is the real bug fix that fixes a fairly scary issue. I hope that helps. Eric
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