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Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 14:01:25 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: ppandit@...hat.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request Linux kernel: fs: udf heap overflow in __udf_adinicb_readpage
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
> Linux kernel built with the UDF file system(CONFIG_UDF_FS) support is
> vulnerable to a crash. It could occur while reading from a corrupted/malicious
> udf file system image.
>
> An unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the kernel resulting in DoS.
>
> Upstream fixes:
> ---------------
> -> https://git.kernel.org/linus/e159332b9af4b04d882dbcfe1bb0117f0a6d4b58
> -> https://git.kernel.org/linus/e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9
> -> https://git.kernel.org/linus/a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c
We feel that this is best covered by three CVE IDs, although not with
a one-to-one mapping. The "length can be too long" problems addressed
in all three commits are assigned CVE-2014-9728.
e159332b9af4b04d882dbcfe1bb0117f0a6d4b58 is also about a separate
data-structure consistency issue (the "iinfo->i_lenAlloc !=
inode->i_size" issue): this is assigned CVE-2014-9729. Finally,
e237ec37ec154564f8690c5bd1795339955eeef9 is also about a separate
state-identification issue ("properly ignore component length for
component types that do not use it"): this is assigned CVE-2014-9730.
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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