Date: Wed, 20 May 2015 13:14:59 -0400 From: Paul Wouters <pwouters@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Logjam attack / Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice On 05/20/2015 07:57 AM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote: > I guess most people will already have seen that, but just in case, > because it might interest readers (even though it's not specifically > about open source stuff). > > https://weakdh.org/ > https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy.pdf Note that it really points to TLS. While they mention other protocols, IKE / IPsec are not really (as) vulnerable. The original IKE design from November 1998 has a minimum MODP group of 768 bits. Why is TLS till allowing 512 bits SEVENTEEN years later? I did a write up on MODP and IKE/IPsec from the freeswan/openswan/libreswan point of view: https://nohats.ca/wordpress/blog/2015/05/20/weakdh-and-ike-ipsec/ TL;DR The LogJam downgrade attack does not apply to MODP groups in the IKE protocol, only to TLS, so IKE or IPsec is not impacted. If you are using libreswan you are not vulnerable to weak MODP groups and using MODP2048 per default unless specifically configured for a lower MODP group. If you are using openswan with IKEv2 you are using MODP2048, but if you are using IKEv1 you are using MODP1536 which is still much stronger than MODP768 or MODP1024. Libreswan as a client to a weak server will allow MODP1024 in IKEv1 as the least secure option, and MODP1536 in IKEv2 as the least secure option. Openswan does not properly implement INVALID_KE, so it cannot connect to another DH group than the one it started out as, so it runs the risk of getting locked out if the server side bumps their minimum MODP group to 2048. openswan defaults to MODP1536 in IKEv1 and MODP2048 in IKEv2 [...] Paul
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