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Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2015 11:55:15 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: Re: Problems in automatic crash analysis frameworks

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This is mostly a question for the persons who assigned CVE-2015-1318
and CVE-2015-1862. Should these CVE assignments be interpreted to
mean:

  CVE-2015-1318 - in Apport, an unprivileged user can use a
                  namespace-based attack because there is an execve by
                  root after a chroot into a user-specified directory

  CVE-2015-1862 - in ABRT, an unprivileged user can use a
                  namespace-based attack because there is an execve by
                  root after a chroot into a user-specified directory

with "Furthermore, Abrt suffers from numerous race conditions and
symlink problems" not yet mapped to any CVE IDs? (CVE-2012-5660 is a
similar but older issue.) These additional ABRT issues would seem to
be, for example, independently relevant on a system where the kernel
was built without namespaces support. However, the raceabrt.c
attachment says "This is a race condition exploit for CVE-2015-1862."

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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