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Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 16:07:19 -0400
From: Eric Windisch <ewindisch@...ker.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: 2 moderate (borderline low) docker flaws fixed in
 >=1.5 and possibly earlier

>
>
> tjay@  (our docker guy) verified they were fixed as you can see from his
> comments in the bugs.
>
> This is an example of why we need to clean these old things out. Nobody
> really cares about them, and in all likelihood they got fixed by upstream
>

It would seem so, yes.

For the 'tmp' issue, we were contacted at Docker about tmp directory usage
during building or running of tests for Docker itself. It is not clear if
CVE-2014-0047 is a reflection of this, but it appears so. In that specific
case, we performed triage and determined that either no such abuses of tmp
existed at the time, or that those uses of tmp were run within containers
in such a way that no vulnerability existed.



> > (CVE-2014-0048)
> > Could this be a dupe of the index.docker.io registry misconfiguration
> > that had at least one redirect to http:// (now fixed) for the actual
> > (unverified) image data?
>
> No, this was stuff like downloading debian signing keys over http rather
> than https, and other sensitive content in similarly unsafe ways.


>From the descriptions I've read here, I had also thought this was a
duplicate of CVE-2014-5277 (HTTP downgrade attack against registry).

Both of these reports precede the establishment of a focused security team
and process at Docker.

Regards,
Eric Windisch

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