Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 10:23:12 -0400 (EDT) From: Siddharth Sharma <siddharth@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: jmm@...ian.org, cve-assign@...re.org Subject: Re: Re: CVE request: spencer regexp Hi, One more thing is that to trigger that any application have to be bad enough to parse unsanitized regex. I think that sense it depends on how the application is written. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Siddharth Sharma / Red Hat Product Security ----- Original Message ----- From: "Siddharth Sharma" <siddharth@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: jmm@...ian.org, cve-assign@...re.org Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2015 7:48:47 PM Subject: Re: [oss-security] Re: CVE request: spencer regexp Hi, That seems to be possible via php, using php_ereg(), php_ereg_replace() , php_ereg_split() which might call regcomp() in backend. Regards, ------------------------------------------- Siddharth Sharma / Red Hat Product Security ----- Original Message ----- From: cve-assign@...re.org To: jmm@...ian.org, siddharth@...hat.com Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2015 10:41:59 PM Subject: [oss-security] Re: CVE request: spencer regexp -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/695940 > https://guidovranken.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/full-disclosure-heap-overflow-in-h-spencers-regex-library-on-32-bit-systems/ http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/07/14 says "I have to admit we're having a hard time trying to think of a service that exposes regcomp(3) over the internet." http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/16/8 says "in many cases the code is only used when building for Android or Windows" and indirectly refers to multiple bugs such as: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=778396 https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=778395 For example: Package: cups The regex copy is only used when building on Windows. I double-checked by removing the entire vcnet/regex directory and rebuilding cups. This is potentially ambiguous. We thought that "when building on Windows" would imply something like "if a user is following the steps in the CUPS INSTALL.txt file on a Windows machine, then that user is able to provide malicious input to the regcomp function during one of those steps." It now appears that what was meant was "The problematic regcomp function is present in a Windows build of CUPS. Any exploitation could occur only after the build has finished." In general, when one oss-security post suggests that an issue may not be realistically exploitable with untrusted input (e.g., "having a hard time trying to think of a service" above), and no other oss-security post suggests that the issue is realistically exploitable, then there might not be a CVE assignment. Here, we'll propose an exploitation scenario for comment. We think that this is (at least marginally) realistic, although it might not be. Unless there's an objection stating that no realistic exploitation scenario can exist, we'll assign a CVE ID for the original regcomp bug this week. Example: Someone develops a new email filtering language as an alternative to Sieve (RFC 5228). Like Sieve, the language's scripts are intended to run on a mail server that does not permit arbitrary code execution by ordinary mailbox owners. In the new language, the match type of ":matches" is implemented with regcomp. There is no limit on script size, and thus the 682 Mb requirement from the regcomp bug report isn't a concern. It is plausible that an ordinary mailbox owner can create a script that triggers the bug and achieves remote code execution on the mail server. - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVAHbeAAoJEKllVAevmvmsucwIAJBGMGBHsZg1oKSFhEn2wCJ7 el1LhsIHmAk0R4rQ1E5IAQFgfNvZ5dA0lagHA7V3prYCM5rgtgGzPTA6SE0Bljl7 rTCcxZKxs9jXJKnQsV566sdqUcN86WX8ZKp/IqBLxMa9uufi+fbdDeSYGU5R4rF4 JvrLoRWokvdwkOxB+M4mykKKeEV0+52hBmmC/xxUdVJPdwgTEvL+SL93q8XQlZNN BKaFoF6sczCxwWo50u/87qUY44hkwTonHIw6ABWELPH6f0+pgG6T5vlbYS1HVPfn XcY6Sz4iyYmtt5AElhwRHaMVuG9EYuHtILPz+Fd5H84ePf18LYe+VQAzZl4S3Jk= =7w/F -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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